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__TOC__ | __TOC__ | ||
= Codebase Security = | |||
==Overview== | |||
:This will always be a work in progress. | |||
=== | ==Assessment== | ||
* | |||
===Analysis by ViSolve=== | |||
:The security team at ViSolve has been evaluating the SQL injection issue in OpenEMR. For this purpose the “SQL Inject Me” tool was used. The tool generated reports documenting few major SQL vulnerabilities. | |||
:Some of the form fields in the application were found to be at high risk, which can be rectified if the latest security mechanism (refer the Plan section below) of the OpenEMR is implemented in the pages where vulnerabilities were found. We also identified that few fields were not validated properly on the server side. | |||
::*[https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B2PXx3MYPPTEaTlTMGR0TUhzRkE/edit?usp=sharing Consolidated Test Result] | |||
::*[[Media:Oemr_sql_injection_test_results.zip|Oemr_sql_injection_test_results.zip]] | |||
===Analysis by SANS Institute=== | |||
*A nice, preliminary report can be found here: | |||
:*[[Media:openemr_vuln_sans.pdf|openemr_vuln_sans.pdf]] | |||
:*Quick summary: | |||
::#Many cross-scripting vulnerabilities | |||
::#Many sql-injection vulnerabilities | |||
::#Valid username extraction (via brute force) | |||
::#Password pass the hash | |||
::#Arbitrary file uploading | |||
===Analysis by OWASP team of the Technical Educational Institute of Larisa=== | |||
*Security analysis of OpenEMR by the OWASP team of the Technical Educational Institute of Larisa (contributed by Avantsys Informatics): | |||
:*[[Media:Openemr-security-report.pdf|openemr-security-report.pdf]] | |||
:*Quick Summary: | |||
::#When uploading files, filenames and/or files are not being filtered/sanitized. | |||
::#Many cross-scripting vulnerabilities | |||
::#Many sql-injection vulnerabilities | |||
===Analysis by Realsearch group at NC State=== | |||
*[http://agile.csc.ncsu.edu/healthcare/doku.php Independent security analysis] by [http://agile.csc.ncsu.edu/realsearch Realsearch group at NC State]. | |||
:The Realsearch group at NC State has been working with OpenEMR in it's evaluation of the CCHIT security criteria. As a part of this research they've done automated testing of the application and have discovered a number of security vulnerabilities with the software. They have gone through and tried to manually verify each vulnerability. The list of actual vulnerabilities, more than 500 in total, can be found at the links below. The true vulnerabilities have a value of True in the 'Vulnerable' column. | :The Realsearch group at NC State has been working with OpenEMR in it's evaluation of the CCHIT security criteria. As a part of this research they've done automated testing of the application and have discovered a number of security vulnerabilities with the software. They have gone through and tried to manually verify each vulnerability. The list of actual vulnerabilities, more than 500 in total, can be found at the links below. The true vulnerabilities have a value of True in the 'Vulnerable' column. | ||
::*[http://spreadsheets.google.com/ccc?key=0AjkGZlXFsp0bdGRsRG1nVzc4NHZhVXMtYnl4d0Y5cWc&hl=en Automated Penetration Testing Test Results] | ::*[http://spreadsheets.google.com/ccc?key=0AjkGZlXFsp0bdGRsRG1nVzc4NHZhVXMtYnl4d0Y5cWc&hl=en Automated Penetration Testing Test Results] | ||
Line 30: | Line 60: | ||
:::Path Disclosure (1) | :::Path Disclosure (1) | ||
===Analysis by Project Insecurity=== | |||
:[[Media:Openemr insecurity.pdf]] | |||
===Miscellaneous Analysis=== | |||
*Some sort of software convention ([http://www.eurostarconferences.com/ Eurostar 2009]) looking for OpenEMR bugs, still waiting for them to post the bugs. Here are all the links pertaining to this: [http://www.eurostarconferences.com/blog/2009/12/9/when-is-a-conference-more-than-a-conference.aspx link1] [http://www.workroom-productions.com/blog/2009/12/testlab-followup-not-yet.html Link2] [http://www.developsense.com/2009/12/eurostars-test-lab-bravo.html link3] [http://www.developsense.com/2009/12/best-bug-or-bugs.html link4] [http://thetesteye.com/blog/2009/12/notes-from-eurostar-2009/ link5] | *Some sort of software convention ([http://www.eurostarconferences.com/ Eurostar 2009]) looking for OpenEMR bugs, still waiting for them to post the bugs. Here are all the links pertaining to this: [http://www.eurostarconferences.com/blog/2009/12/9/when-is-a-conference-more-than-a-conference.aspx link1] [http://www.workroom-productions.com/blog/2009/12/testlab-followup-not-yet.html Link2] [http://www.developsense.com/2009/12/eurostars-test-lab-bravo.html link3] [http://www.developsense.com/2009/12/best-bug-or-bugs.html link4] [http://thetesteye.com/blog/2009/12/notes-from-eurostar-2009/ link5] | ||
==Plan== | |||
===Maintain updated securing OpenEMR instructions for users=== | |||
:This is maintained at the [[Securing OpenEMR]] wiki page. | |||
=== | |||
===CSRF=== | |||
:Cross-Site Request Forgery. | |||
::First commit in main codebase with the main mechanism and example of use in adminacl scripts: | |||
::*https://github.com/openemr/openemr/commit/1510ed42cf86fc76572e4d9c0875d953acfc5c93 | |||
::Subsequent commits: | |||
::*https://github.com/openemr/openemr/commit/373ca9c7bc8bea464250785c68fb2bd2d147ffd9 | |||
::*https://github.com/openemr/openemr/commit/f0a642e437299c2a609ee6bb70e8e53294a919fa | |||
::*https://github.com/openemr/openemr/commit/31eeaa3058a61db664aee0b9caf4873bc0c79cd4 | |||
::*https://github.com/openemr/openemr/commit/23f0cc3b6e439e724fb424588ca8cfa320e26930 | |||
::*https://github.com/openemr/openemr/commit/6fa02fdbb4cc3f6680d1260b3654491186b44ee3 | |||
::*and many more commits... | |||
:Added samesite cookie use for when using PHP 7.3+ (for OpenEMR 5.0.2+) | |||
===Escape Shell Commands=== | |||
:Walking through the codebase and use escapeshellcmd() and escapeshellarg() functions to prevent vulnerabilities that stem from using shell commands in php. | |||
===CSV (Formula) Injection=== | |||
:Use the csvEscape() function. | |||
:: | ===Log Injection=== | ||
:* https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Log_Injection | |||
:* Use the errorLogEscape() function to sanitize the log output. | |||
<pre> | <pre> | ||
$ | error_log('Error in following: ' . errorLogEscape($errorVariable));</pre> | ||
:: | ===Header Sanitation=== | ||
:* https://www.netsparker.com/blog/web-security/crlf-http-header/ | |||
:* Currently researching best method to prevent this. | |||
:* https://github.com/openemr/openemr/issues/2357 | |||
===SQL-Injection=== | |||
::''' | ::'''Utilize binding/placeholders in sql calls (prevents sql-injection).''' | ||
<pre> | <pre> | ||
sqlStatement=("DELETE FROM immunizations WHERE id =? LIMIT 1",array($_GET['id']);</pre> | sqlStatement=("DELETE FROM immunizations WHERE id =? LIMIT 1",array($_GET['id']);</pre> | ||
::::* '''Exception to step | ::::* '''Exception to step 1 for when there are a large number of variable in the sql query(if do this, need to treat all variables this way; meaning do not combine the two methods in one statement to avoid the '?' character within datafields breaking things)(also ensure surround the variable with the single quotes):''' | ||
<pre> | <pre> | ||
sqlStatement=("UPDATE lists SET " . | sqlStatement=("UPDATE lists SET " . | ||
"type = '" . add_escape_custom($text_type) . "', " . | "type = '" . add_escape_custom($text_type) . "', " . | ||
Line 76: | Line 112: | ||
"comments = '". add_escape_custom($_POST['form_comments']) . "', " . | "comments = '". add_escape_custom($_POST['form_comments']) . "', " . | ||
...</pre> | ...</pre> | ||
::::* '''Exception to step 1 for when a variable represents a sql table:''' | |||
<pre> | |||
sqlStatement=("DELETE FROM ".escape_table_name($table_name)." WHERE id =1");</pre> | |||
::::* '''Exception to step 1 for when a variable represents a sql column (long form; ie. $column_name = users.fname )(Note that the second parameters is the table the column is from and you can send multiple tables):''' | |||
<pre> | |||
sqlStatement=("SELECT ".escape_sql_column_name($column_name,array("users"),TRUE)." FROM users WHERE id =1");</pre> | |||
::::* '''Exception to step 1 for when a variable represents a sql column (short form; ie. $column_name = fname )(Note that the second parameters is the table the column is from and you can send multiple tables):''' | |||
<pre> | |||
sqlStatement=("SELECT ".escape_sql_column_name($column_name,array("users"))." FROM users WHERE id =1");</pre> | |||
::::* '''Exception to step 1 for when a variable represents a LIMIT amount(s):''' | |||
<pre> | |||
sqlStatement=("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id =1 LIMIT ".escape_limit($limit_number));</pre> | |||
::::* '''Exception to step 1 for when a variable represents a sort ordering sql keyword(asc or desc):''' | |||
<pre> | |||
sqlStatement=("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id =1 ORDER BY id ".escape_sort_order($sort_order_keyword));</pre> | |||
::::* '''Exception to step 1 for when a variable represents a another sql identifier not covered yet(if there are any). Two possible methods exist and the first one is the preferred method:''' | |||
:::::* '''If all the possible options are known beforehand, then use(note that if you send TRUE for the third parameter, then it will die() and throw an error if there is no match): | |||
<pre> | |||
$options = array("users","patients","documents"); | |||
sqlStatement=("DELETE FROM ".escape_identifier($identifier,$options)." WHERE id =1");</pre> | |||
:::::* '''If all the possible options are not known beforehand, then use (this method is experimental only): | |||
<pre> | |||
sqlStatement=("DELETE FROM ".escape_identifier($identifier)." WHERE id =1");</pre> | |||
===Cross-Scripting Prevention=== | |||
::''' | ::'''Utilize htmlspecialchars function wrappers from library/htmlspecialchars.inc.php. These functions have ample documentation within that file. (prevents cross-scripting attacks)''' | ||
<pre> | <pre> | ||
$para_class = attr($db_data); //is escaped(including quotes) | $para_class = attr($db_data); //is escaped(including quotes) | ||
$para_content = text($user_data); //is escaped(not including quotes) | $para_content = text($user_data); //is escaped(not including quotes) | ||
Line 86: | Line 144: | ||
$header_text = xlt('My Header'); //is translated and escaped(not including quotes) | $header_text = xlt('My Header'); //is translated and escaped(not including quotes) | ||
echo "<h3>$header_text</h3><p class='$para_class' title='$title_text'>$para_content</p>\n";</pre> | echo "<h3>$header_text</h3><p class='$para_class' title='$title_text'>$para_content</p>\n";</pre> | ||
::::* '''Exception to step | ::::* '''Exception to step 2 for javascript literals; when using javascript literals, utilize the custom js_escape() function instead to prevent white screen of death, or for translation strings use the custom xlj() function; both these functions can be found in library/htmlspecialchars.inc.php''' | ||
<pre> | |||
<script LANGUAGE="JavaScript"> | |||
var example = <?php echo js_escape($variable); ?>; | |||
alert(<?php echo js_escape($db_data)); ?>); | |||
alert(<?php echo xlj('This software is the best'); ?> | |||
</script></pre> | |||
::::* '''Exception to step 2 for when escaping in the javascript context, however then inject the variable into html; utilize the custom javascript jsText() and jsAttr() functions; both these functions can be found in library/js/utility.js''' | |||
<pre> | <pre> | ||
<script LANGUAGE="JavaScript"> | <script LANGUAGE="JavaScript"> | ||
var example = <?php echo js_escape($variable); ?>; | |||
alert(example); | |||
element.innerHTML = jsText(example); | |||
</script></pre> | </script></pre> | ||
::::* '''Another rare exception to step 2 when further nesting php variable within a javascript literal that is nested within html code.''' | |||
<pre> | |||
"<a href='' onclick='return selcode(" . js_attr($drug_id) . ")'>"; | |||
</pre> | |||
::::* '''Yet another rare exception to step 2 when further nesting php variable within a url html attribute for a get variable.''' | |||
<pre> | |||
echo "<td bgcolor='#CCFFCC' width='10%'><a class='link_submit' href='./forms_admin.php?id=" . attr_url($registry['id']) . "&method=disable&csrf_token_form=" . attr_url(collectCsrfToken()) . "'>" . xlt('enabled') . "</a>"; | |||
</pre> | |||
===Sanitize file and directory names=== | |||
:Use the functions in the library/sanitize.inc.php script. | |||
=== | ===Secure method to upload files=== | ||
:Use the functions in the library/sanitize.inc.php script. | |||
:Optional feature to only allow certain filetypes when uploading patient documents: | |||
::*https://www.open-emr.org/wiki/index.php/Administration_Globals#Secure_Upload_Files_with_White_List | |||
: | |||
: | |||
===Secure the Embedded Third Party Elements=== | |||
:Ensure continue to secure/update the third party elements | |||
:*List of the [[OpenEMR_Wiki_Home_Page#Embedded_Components|Embedded Components is here]]. | |||
=== | ===Do not allow guessing of usernames=== | ||
:Avoid any code in the future that allows attackers to guess usernames. | |||
[[Category:Security]][[Category:Developer Guide]] | [[Category:Security]][[Category:Developer Guide]] |
Latest revision as of 06:41, 15 August 2020
Codebase Security
Overview
- This will always be a work in progress.
Assessment
Analysis by ViSolve
- The security team at ViSolve has been evaluating the SQL injection issue in OpenEMR. For this purpose the “SQL Inject Me” tool was used. The tool generated reports documenting few major SQL vulnerabilities.
- Some of the form fields in the application were found to be at high risk, which can be rectified if the latest security mechanism (refer the Plan section below) of the OpenEMR is implemented in the pages where vulnerabilities were found. We also identified that few fields were not validated properly on the server side.
Analysis by SANS Institute
- A nice, preliminary report can be found here:
- openemr_vuln_sans.pdf
- Quick summary:
- Many cross-scripting vulnerabilities
- Many sql-injection vulnerabilities
- Valid username extraction (via brute force)
- Password pass the hash
- Arbitrary file uploading
Analysis by OWASP team of the Technical Educational Institute of Larisa
- Security analysis of OpenEMR by the OWASP team of the Technical Educational Institute of Larisa (contributed by Avantsys Informatics):
- openemr-security-report.pdf
- Quick Summary:
- When uploading files, filenames and/or files are not being filtered/sanitized.
- Many cross-scripting vulnerabilities
- Many sql-injection vulnerabilities
Analysis by Realsearch group at NC State
- The Realsearch group at NC State has been working with OpenEMR in it's evaluation of the CCHIT security criteria. As a part of this research they've done automated testing of the application and have discovered a number of security vulnerabilities with the software. They have gone through and tried to manually verify each vulnerability. The list of actual vulnerabilities, more than 500 in total, can be found at the links below. The true vulnerabilities have a value of True in the 'Vulnerable' column.
- As a summary, here are the types of issues they've found and their counts:
- Fortify 360:
- Cross-Site Scripting (215)
- Nonexistent Access Control (129)
- Dangerous Function (24)
- Path Manipulation (20)
- Error Information Leak (19)
- Global Variable Manipulation (9)
- Insecure Upload (8)
- Improper Cookie Use (7)
- HTTP Header Manipulation (4)
- Rational AppScan:
- Cross-Site Scripting (50)
- Phishing Through Frames (25)
- Cross-Site Request Forgery (22)
- Error Message Information Leak (14)
- SQL Injection (4)
- JavaScript Cookie References (6)
- Directory Listing (6)
- Password Not Encrypted (2)
- Path Disclosure (1)
- Fortify 360:
Analysis by Project Insecurity
Miscellaneous Analysis
- Some sort of software convention (Eurostar 2009) looking for OpenEMR bugs, still waiting for them to post the bugs. Here are all the links pertaining to this: link1 Link2 link3 link4 link5
Plan
Maintain updated securing OpenEMR instructions for users
- This is maintained at the Securing OpenEMR wiki page.
CSRF
- Cross-Site Request Forgery.
- First commit in main codebase with the main mechanism and example of use in adminacl scripts:
- Subsequent commits:
- https://github.com/openemr/openemr/commit/373ca9c7bc8bea464250785c68fb2bd2d147ffd9
- https://github.com/openemr/openemr/commit/f0a642e437299c2a609ee6bb70e8e53294a919fa
- https://github.com/openemr/openemr/commit/31eeaa3058a61db664aee0b9caf4873bc0c79cd4
- https://github.com/openemr/openemr/commit/23f0cc3b6e439e724fb424588ca8cfa320e26930
- https://github.com/openemr/openemr/commit/6fa02fdbb4cc3f6680d1260b3654491186b44ee3
- and many more commits...
- Added samesite cookie use for when using PHP 7.3+ (for OpenEMR 5.0.2+)
Escape Shell Commands
- Walking through the codebase and use escapeshellcmd() and escapeshellarg() functions to prevent vulnerabilities that stem from using shell commands in php.
CSV (Formula) Injection
- Use the csvEscape() function.
Log Injection
- https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Log_Injection
- Use the errorLogEscape() function to sanitize the log output.
error_log('Error in following: ' . errorLogEscape($errorVariable));
Header Sanitation
- https://www.netsparker.com/blog/web-security/crlf-http-header/
- Currently researching best method to prevent this.
- https://github.com/openemr/openemr/issues/2357
SQL-Injection
- Utilize binding/placeholders in sql calls (prevents sql-injection).
sqlStatement=("DELETE FROM immunizations WHERE id =? LIMIT 1",array($_GET['id']);
- Exception to step 1 for when there are a large number of variable in the sql query(if do this, need to treat all variables this way; meaning do not combine the two methods in one statement to avoid the '?' character within datafields breaking things)(also ensure surround the variable with the single quotes):
sqlStatement=("UPDATE lists SET " . "type = '" . add_escape_custom($text_type) . "', " . "title = '" . add_escape_custom($_POST['form_title']) . "', " . "comments = '". add_escape_custom($_POST['form_comments']) . "', " . ...
- Exception to step 1 for when a variable represents a sql table:
sqlStatement=("DELETE FROM ".escape_table_name($table_name)." WHERE id =1");
- Exception to step 1 for when a variable represents a sql column (long form; ie. $column_name = users.fname )(Note that the second parameters is the table the column is from and you can send multiple tables):
sqlStatement=("SELECT ".escape_sql_column_name($column_name,array("users"),TRUE)." FROM users WHERE id =1");
- Exception to step 1 for when a variable represents a sql column (short form; ie. $column_name = fname )(Note that the second parameters is the table the column is from and you can send multiple tables):
sqlStatement=("SELECT ".escape_sql_column_name($column_name,array("users"))." FROM users WHERE id =1");
- Exception to step 1 for when a variable represents a LIMIT amount(s):
sqlStatement=("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id =1 LIMIT ".escape_limit($limit_number));
- Exception to step 1 for when a variable represents a sort ordering sql keyword(asc or desc):
sqlStatement=("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id =1 ORDER BY id ".escape_sort_order($sort_order_keyword));
- Exception to step 1 for when a variable represents a another sql identifier not covered yet(if there are any). Two possible methods exist and the first one is the preferred method:
- If all the possible options are known beforehand, then use(note that if you send TRUE for the third parameter, then it will die() and throw an error if there is no match):
$options = array("users","patients","documents"); sqlStatement=("DELETE FROM ".escape_identifier($identifier,$options)." WHERE id =1");
- If all the possible options are not known beforehand, then use (this method is experimental only):
sqlStatement=("DELETE FROM ".escape_identifier($identifier)." WHERE id =1");
Cross-Scripting Prevention
- Utilize htmlspecialchars function wrappers from library/htmlspecialchars.inc.php. These functions have ample documentation within that file. (prevents cross-scripting attacks)
$para_class = attr($db_data); //is escaped(including quotes) $para_content = text($user_data); //is escaped(not including quotes) $title_text = xla('My Title'); //is translated and escaped(including quotes) $header_text = xlt('My Header'); //is translated and escaped(not including quotes) echo "<h3>$header_text</h3><p class='$para_class' title='$title_text'>$para_content</p>\n";
- Exception to step 2 for javascript literals; when using javascript literals, utilize the custom js_escape() function instead to prevent white screen of death, or for translation strings use the custom xlj() function; both these functions can be found in library/htmlspecialchars.inc.php
<script LANGUAGE="JavaScript"> var example = <?php echo js_escape($variable); ?>; alert(<?php echo js_escape($db_data)); ?>); alert(<?php echo xlj('This software is the best'); ?> </script>
- Exception to step 2 for when escaping in the javascript context, however then inject the variable into html; utilize the custom javascript jsText() and jsAttr() functions; both these functions can be found in library/js/utility.js
<script LANGUAGE="JavaScript"> var example = <?php echo js_escape($variable); ?>; alert(example); element.innerHTML = jsText(example); </script>
- Another rare exception to step 2 when further nesting php variable within a javascript literal that is nested within html code.
"<a href='' onclick='return selcode(" . js_attr($drug_id) . ")'>";
- Yet another rare exception to step 2 when further nesting php variable within a url html attribute for a get variable.
echo "<td bgcolor='#CCFFCC' width='10%'><a class='link_submit' href='./forms_admin.php?id=" . attr_url($registry['id']) . "&method=disable&csrf_token_form=" . attr_url(collectCsrfToken()) . "'>" . xlt('enabled') . "</a>";
Sanitize file and directory names
- Use the functions in the library/sanitize.inc.php script.
Secure method to upload files
- Use the functions in the library/sanitize.inc.php script.
- Optional feature to only allow certain filetypes when uploading patient documents:
Secure the Embedded Third Party Elements
- Ensure continue to secure/update the third party elements
- List of the Embedded Components is here.
Do not allow guessing of usernames
- Avoid any code in the future that allows attackers to guess usernames.